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Casenote
Shorter v. Drury: Refusal to Permit Treatment
Constitutes Express Assumption of Risk
Which Can Reduce the Liability of a
Negligent Physician
I.

INTRODUCTION

With medical malpractice litigation rapidly increasing,1 measures are needed to ensure that damages are equitably apportioned
among the litigants. Various legislatures have enacted statutes to
reduce both the filing of malpractice claims and the amount recoverable in malpractice actions, 2 but the issue of apportionment of
liability has been left to the comparative fault laws of each jurisdiction.3 The common-law defense of express assumption of risk,4
1. See P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS (1982); 10 MED. LIAB. (Cap.) 1 (Jan. 1985) (patients are filing three times as
many claims as they did ten years ago; in 1983, 16 claims were filed per 100 physicians); 9
MED. LIAB. (Cap.) 1 (Nov. 1984) (one claim is now filed per 12 physicians); see also
Raspberry, Litigation Fever: what remedy? Chi. Tribune, Nov. 12, 1985, at 21, col. 3.
2. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980) (limits recovery of
noneconomic damages to $250,000); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. §§ 38-19b to 38-19f (West
Supp. 1985) (optional prelitigation screening panel); IDAHO CODE § 6-1001 (1979)
(same); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
2-622 (1985) (punitive damages not allowed;
mandatory review panel; held unconstitutional in Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-6627 (Cir. Ct.
Cook County Ill. Dec. 19,1985), appeal docketed, No. 62876 (Ill. Sup. Ct. Dec. 30, 1985);
IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-1 (1984) (mandatory screening panel); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.39(B) (West Supp. 1986) ($500,000 cap placed on medical malpractice damages); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 §§ 2801 to 2809 (Sapp. 1985) (optional screening
panel); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-104 (1985) (mandatory screening panel); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN.

§2711.21 (1981) (mandatory arbitration); OR. REV. STAT. ch. 752.040

(1977) (physician's financial liability limited to sum payable under insurance policy); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (Supp. 1985) ($500,000 cap placed on general damages); VA. CODE § 8:01-581.15 (1984) (total amount recoverable not to exceed one million dollars); WISC. STAT. § 655.19(3) (Supp. 1985) (plaintiff may not recover more than
$25,000 if he alleged $25,000 or less in damages, unless court finds plaintiff could not
have known extent of injuries when suit was filed); see also 10 MED. LIAB. (Cap.) 12 (Jan.
1985) (Florida task force recommends a $500,000 cap on damages for pain and suffering).
See generally H. ALSOBROOK, JR. & S. MAUKAUF, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COURSE
MANUAL 258-86 (1985); S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF
MALPRACTICE 120-48 (1978) (overview of alternative dispute resolutions); NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, BEYOND MALPRACTICE: COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL INJURIES 29-51 (1978) (evaluation of various approaches to compensation).

3. See infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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however, also can help produce equitable apportionment of damages.' The successful assertion of express assumption of risk
reduces the plaintiff's recovery in situations in which the plaintiff
knowingly and voluntarily consented to encounter a specific risk
associated with medical treatment.6
Medical professionals can raise the defense in situations in which
a patient has exercised his right to refuse a particular form of medical treatment and has been injured as a result of his refusal.7 The
physician should require that the patient document his refusal to
the procedure.8 The validity of a refusal form as a manifestation of
express assumption of risk was first litigated before a state court of
last resort in Shorter v. Drury.9 The Supreme Court of Washington
considered whether a patient's express refusal to accept a blood
transfusion relieved the physician from all consequences resulting
from the refusal. ' 0 The court held that a refusal form signed by the
patient and her husband was valid, 1 and that the2 patient had expressly assumed the consequences of her refusal.'
This note will examine the validity of a refusal as a damagereducing factor in medical malpractice actions. The note first will
discuss whether express assumption of risk survived the adoption
of comparative fault systems in various states. Next, the note will
review the history of assumption of risk in medical malpractice actions. The patient's constitutional right to refuse treatment will be
compared with the conflicting interests of the state and the medical
profession. The patient's duty to mitigate his damages also will be
reviewed. This note will then discuss the Shorter court's decision
that a refusal to accept treatment constitutes a damage-reducing
express assumption of risk. After analyzing the decision's shortcomings, the note will suggest that patients who refuse treatment
should suffer the consequences of their failure to mitigate damages.
This note will conclude with a discussion of the Shorter holding's
potential impact on medical malpractice litigation and on the ethical dilemma faced by hospitals and physicians whose patients refuse treatment.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 41-66 and accompanying text.
See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 86 (1985).
Id. at 650-53, 695 P.2d at 119-21.
Id. at 651, 695 P.2d at 120.
Id. at 659, 695 P.2d at 124.

1986]

Shorter v. Drury

II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Interaction Between Express Assumption of Risk and
Comparative Negligence

The adoption of comparative fault 13 standards threatened the
survival of assumption of risk as an affirmative defense. 4 At common law, assumption of risk once served as a total bar to recovery.' 5 In order to allege that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of
the defendant's conduct, the defendant had to establish that the
plaintiff knew and understood the specific risk to which he had
consented to expose himself. 16 In addition, the plaintiff had to
have chosen voluntarily to incur that specific risk.' 7
The courts have recognized both express and implied assumption of risk. Express assumption of risk involves an oral or written
manifestation of consent to encounter a specific risk, a consent
which relieves the defendant from liability for injuries arising from
the conduct that gives rise to the risk.' 8 Implied assumption of risk
also involves a voluntary submission to the conduct of another
party, but this consent is manifested simply through conduct, not
through an express agreement. 19
The adoption of comparative fault generally eliminated the use
13. See infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text. The various jurisdictions have entitled their comparative fault acts differently. Some jurisdictions refer to "comparative
fault," see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4 (West Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.22.005 (Supp. 1986), while others refer to "comparative negligence," see, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141
(1973). There is no appreciable difference between the two phrases. This note will use
the phrase "comparative fault" to describe the laws in both of these types of jurisdictions.
14. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
15. See Keegan v. Anchor Inns, Inc., 606 F.2d 35, 37 (3d Cir. 1979); Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club, 135 Ill. App. 3d 429, 433, 481 N.E.2d 1037, 1041 (1985); see also
infra text accompanying note 20.
16. See Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 656, 695 P.2d 116, 123, cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 86 (1985); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 489 (1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON]; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).

17. See Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 240, 245, 418 P.2d 153, 156,
53 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548 (1966); Yandle v. Alexander, 116 Ga. App. 165, 167, 156 S.E.2d
504, 506 (1967); Settles v. Strobridge Lithographing Co., 101 Ohio App. 479, 481, 136
N.E.2d 925, 926 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965).
18. See Keegan v. Anchor Inns, Inc., 606 F.2d 35, 37 (3d Cir. 1979); Blackburn v.
Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1977); M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL & D. AXELROD, 5 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 48.23[l] (1985) [hereinafter cited as DAMAGES IN
TORT ACTIONS]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).

19. See Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club, 135 Ill. App. 3d 429, 433, 481 N.E.2d
1037, 1041 (1985) (attendance at golf tournament was conduct through which plaintiff
impliedly assumed risk of being struck by golf ball); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 496C (1965).
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of assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery.2" Comparative
fault requires that the conduct of the plaintiff and the defendant be
compared for the purpose of equitably distributing liability. 21 The
plaintiff's damages are reduced by the percentage of total fault attributable to his own conduct.22
American jurisdictions have adopted several different comparative fault standards.23 The "pure" comparative fault jurisdictions,
for example, allow a plaintiff to recover something unless his own
conduct was the sole cause of his injuries.24 Many states, however,
allow the plaintiff to recover only if his culpability is less than or
equal to that of the defendant." Other states limit recovery to situations in which the plaintiff's fault is less than that of the defendant.2 6 Two states have adopted what has come to be referred to as
the "slight-gross" approach: the plaintiff can recover only if his
20. See infra notes 21-32 and accompanying text. But see Salinas v. Vierstra, 107
Idaho 984, 994, 695 P.2d 369, 375 (1985).
21. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974); H. WOODS,
THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT (1978).
22. See Alvis v. Ribar, 85 111. 2d 1, 16, 421 N.E.2d 886, 892 (1981).
23. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. The following jurisdictions have
declined to adopt comparative fault: Alabama, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. See generally H. WOODS,
supra note 21.
24. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.
3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713
(Ky. 1984); Placek v. Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d
1234 (1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-25-5 (Supp. 1984); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2323 (West Supp. 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW
§ 1411 (McKinney 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.22.005 (Supp. 1986).
25. These states are referred to as the "as great as" jurisdictions. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52.572h (West Supp. 1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31(a) (1976); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4(a) (West Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.1 (West Supp.
1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 604.01 (West Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41.141 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1983); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A-15-5.1
(Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 13 (West Supp. 1985); ORE. REV. STAT. § 18.475(2) (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1036 (Supp. 1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1983).
26. These states are referred to as the "not as great as" jurisdictions. See Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27.1764
(1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1984);
IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1983); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (Supp. 1985); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Purdon 1982); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 33.001 (Vernon Supp.
1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977); WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109(a) (1977).
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fault is slight when compared with that of the defendant.27
Various states have reached different conclusions as to whether
express assumption of risk has survived the adoption of comparative fault. 2 The defense remains viable in nearly a quarter of the
states. 21 Some of these jurisdictions limit the use of express assumption of risk to situations involving a contractual relationship. a0 In other states, the plaintiff's express assumption of risk is
treated as a distinct type of fault to be compared with the defendant's conduct; it is not characterized as a form of contributory
negligence. 3' Most jurisdictions, however, have not yet determined
whether express assumption
of risk has survived the adoption of
32
comparative fault.
27. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2
(1979).
28. The effect of comparative fault on implied assumption of risk is beyond the scope
of this article. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 16, at 495-98; Annot., 16

A.L.R.4th 700 (1982).
29. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824-25, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 872-73 (1975); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1977); Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 994, 695 P.2d 369, 375 (1985) (absolute bar to recovery); Larsen v.
Vic Tanny Int'l, 130 Ill. App. 3d 574, 576, 474 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1984); Wilson v.
Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 401 (Me. 1976); Mayer v. Howard, 220 Neb. 328, 333-34, 370
N.W.2d 93, 97 (1985) (per curiam); Leiner v. First Wythe Ave. Service Station, Inc., 121
Misc. 2d 559, 560-61, 468 N.Y.S.2d 302, 304 (Civ. Ct. 1983); Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6
Ohio St. 3d 110, 113, 451 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1983); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County
School Dist., 496 Pa. 590, 613, 437 A.2d 1198, 1209 (1981); Farley v. M. M. Cattle Co.,
529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975); Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116, cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 86 (1985); Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 258, 120 N.W.2d 63,
67 (1963).
30. See Larsen v. Vic Tanny Int'l, 130 Ill. App. 3d 574, 577, 474 N.E.2d 729, 731
(1984); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 401 (Me. 1976).
31. See Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 113-14, 451 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1983);
Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 75, 376 A.2d 329, 333 (1977);
Annot., 16 A.L.R.4th 700, 711-15 (1982); see also infra text accompanying notes 109-111.
32. Some jurisdictions have statutes which address assumption of risk in general
terms. For example, statutes in two states abolished assumption of risk without qualification.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52. 572h(c) (West Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1986). A statute in one state abolished only implied assumption of risk, thereby creating a strong inference that express assumption of
risk survived. See OR. REV. STAT. § 18.475(2) (1981); 5 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS,
supra note 18, at § 48.23[2] n.3 (where only a specific form of assumption of risk is abolished, the other forms remain viable). Three states's statutes include an "unreasonable
assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express agreement" within the definition of comparative fault. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4(a) (West Supp. 1985); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 668.1 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. §604.01 (Supp. 1985). Others simply address assumption of risk in terms of calculating liability. See ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-1763 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 12 (West Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-27-37 (1977). One jurisdiction specifically leaves the factual determination as to
whether the defense exists to the jury. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 12 (West Supp.
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Express Assumption of Risk In Medical Malpractice
33
Actions

When a physician raises the assumption-of-risk defense, he must
establish that the patient knew of and understood the specific risk
which led to the injury.3 4 The patient generally has no medical
training, 35 and therefore must depend on the physician to perform
his professional duty of acquainting the patient with the risks of
proposed procedures so that the patient can make an informed decision about his treatment.36 If the physician fails in this duty, the
patient cannot later be held to have assumed a risk which he
neither knew nor appreciated.37
1985). No reported case construing any of these statutes discusses the survival of express
assumption of risk.
The jurisdictions which have not specifically addressed the survival of express assumption of risk are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. See generally H.
WOODS, supra note 21. Perhaps the defense has been abolished or perhaps it retains its
own legal identity, separate from other forms of comparative fault.
33. See generally D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, 1 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 9.02
(1985); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1043 (1956).
34. Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 566 (D.C. 1979); Shorter v. Drury, 103
Wash. 2d 645, 657, 695 P.2d 116, 123, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 86 (1985); PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 16, at 489.
35. See Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 567 (D.C. 1979); Hales v. Raines,
162 Mo. App. 46, 65, 141 S.W. 917, 922 (1911).
36. See In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985); PROSSER AND KEETON,
supra note 16, at 189-92. The physician's disclosure must be one which a reasonable
physician would make under similar circumstances. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note
16, at 191. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.) (a physician has
no duty to inform a patient of dangers "of which persons of average sophistication are
aware"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181,
207 (E.D. La. 1980) (doctor and patient have fiduciary relationship; the aim of informed
consent is to ensure that the patient is aware of the risks related to the procedure and to
receive his agreement to encounter those risks); Martin v. Bralliar, 540 P.2d 1118, 1120
(Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (physician's duty includes informing the patient of the general and
specific risks associated with the procedure; the communication of the general risks does
not satisfy the duty to disclose the specific risks); Miceikis v. Field, 37 Ill. App. 3d 763,
768, 347 N.E.2d 320, 324 (1976) (physician's duty requires an exercise of discretion with
respect to prudent disclosure of the risks based on the patient's best interests). But see
Padgett v. Ferrier, 172 Ga. App. 335, 323 S.E.2d 166 (1984) (Georgia does not recognize
"informed consent" as a viable legal principle in medical malpractice actions).
37. See, e.g., King v. Solomon, 323 Mass. 326, 329, 81 N.E.2d 838, 840(1948) (physician allowed his patient to become addicted to drugs); Los Alamos Medical Center v.
Coe, 58 N.M. 686, 692-94, 275 P.2d 175, 179-80 (1954) (same); Suria v. Shiffman, 107
A.D.2d 309, 312, 486 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (1985) (transsexual held not to have assumed
the present surgical risks created by his prior participation in a silicone treatment program when he was not cognizant of the risks involved); Largess v. Tatum, 130 Vt. 271,
279-80, 291 A.2d 398, 403 (1972) (plaintiff did not assume risk of refracturing hip after
physician failed to warn her to keep weight off it).
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Of course, it is critical to recognize that a patient cannot assume
the risk of the physician's negligence.38 Assumption of risk in a
medical malpractice action can only be found when the patient has
agreed to encounter an already-existing risk.39 The patient will be
held to have assumed the risks flowing from the preexisting situation if he was fully cognizant of the risks involved and if he voluntarily chose to encounter them. 4°
C.

The ConstitutionalRight to Refuse Medical Treatment
Assumption-of-risk cases involving refusals may implicate at
least two constitutional rights of patients. 4 ' The first of these is the
qualified right to the free exercise of religion. 42 This right is a bifurcated guarantee encompassing two different freedoms: the freedom to believe and the freedom to act. 43 The former is absolute,
but the latter is conditioned upon the particular circumstances surrounding the citizen's exercise of his convictions." The second
constitutional right at issue in some refusal cases is the right to
bodily privacy. 45 Both of these constitutional rights can be implicated when a patient refuses medical treatment and the state issues
a court order compelling treatment.46
38. Mainfort v. Giannestras, 49 Ohio Op. 440, 441-42, 111 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1951);
Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 657-58, 695 P.2d 116, 123, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 86
(1985).
39. See, e.g., Hales v. Raines, 162 Mo. App. 46, 65-66, 141 S.W.2d 917, 922 (1911)
(plaintiff assumed risks inherent in the use of a new x-ray machine); Mainfort v. Giannestras, 49 Ohio Op. 440, 441, 111 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1951) (patient's diabetic condition
constituted an already-existing risk prior to leg-lengthening operation).
40. See, e.g., Champs v. Stone, 74 Ohio App. 344, 58 N.E.2d 803 (1944) (plaintiff
who submitted to blood test fully aware that doctor was "grossly intoxicated" assumed
risk of complications).
41. See infra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
42. See In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Miss. 1985). The first amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..... U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
43. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Biklen v. Board of Educ., 333
F. Supp. 902, 909 (N.D.N.Y. 1971), afl'd, 406 U.S. 951 (1972).
44. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
45. The fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments create a right to privacy. See
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (penumbra in the Bill of Rights guarantees a
woman a qualified right to terminate her pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965) (certain privacies are created by several fundamental guarantees); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977)
("unwritten constitutional right of privacy found in the penumbra of specific guarantees
found in the Bill of Rights").
46. See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000, 1007 (D.C. Cir.) (order granted to allow blood transfusion of adult), reh'g
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The rights to the free exercise of religion and to bodily privacy
can provide the patient with an opportunity to refuse medical
treatment.47 The patient's express consent to the treatment is required to prevent a subsequent allegation of battery;4" hospitals
have a duty to protect patients from being subjected to bodily contacts to which they have not assented. 49 But a patient may refuse
treatment because his religion prohibits medical intervention5 ° or
denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied sub nor. Jones v. President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 374,
205 N.E.2d 435, 443 (1965) (order appointing conservator over adult to compel transfusion reversed); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 621-22, 104 N.E.2d 769,
772 (1952) (court appointed guardian to authorize transfusion of child); Mercy Hosp.,
Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 417-18, 489 A.2d 1130, 1134 (Ct. Sp. App. 1985)
(appointment of guardian denied for pregnant woman in need of transfusion where fetus
was not endangered); In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Miss. 1985) (State ordered
witness transfused against her will so she could testify in a criminal trial); Morrison v.
State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Mo. 1952) (infant adjudged state ward for purpose of administering vital transfusions); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 579,
279 A.2d 670, 671 (1971) (guardian appointed to authorize transfusions for unconscious
adult, over parents' objections); Application of Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 804,
804-05, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996, 996-97 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (court authorized transfusion for adult
patient if necessary to save her life during surgery); Application of Jamaica Hosp., 128
Misc. 2d 1006, 1008, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (transfusion ordered to
protect life of midterm fetus); Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc.
2d 101, 103, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 446 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (court ordered transfusion during
caesarean operation to safeguard lives of both mother and infant); see generally Annot., 9
A.L.R.3d 1391 (1966).
47. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 500-05
(W.D. Wash. 1967) (plaintiffs alleged that juvenile court law which authorized removal
of the children of Jehovah's Witnesses from the custody of their parents for purposes of
medical treatment violated the parents' rights to the free exercise of religion and against
the establishment of religion, as well as their rights to bodily and family privacy), affd,
390 U.S. 598, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968); In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1035-36
(Miss. 1985) (plaintiff who was to be witness in criminal trial refused to allow blood
transfusions, relying on her rights to privacy and the free exercise of religion); see also
infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Grieves v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 159, 165, 203 Cal. Rptr.
556, 560 (1984) (successful battery claim when tubal ligation performed without plaintiff's consent); Karl J. Pizzalotto, M.D., Ltd. v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859, 865 (La. 1983)
(same when hysterectomy performed without patient's consent); Kahoutek v. Hafner,
366 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. App. 1985) (battery alleged when injection given without
consent of conscious patient); see also WISCONSIN Hosp. ASS'N, CONSENT MANUAL 12
(1969).

49.

NORTH DAKOTA Hosp'. Ass'N, CONSENT MANUAL

15 (1968).

50. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Wash. 1967), affid, 390 U.S. 598, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); Matter of Gregory S, 85 Misc. 2d
846, 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Fam. Ct. 1976).
The majority of the "refusal" cases involve Jehovah's Witnesses, members of a fundamentalist Christian society who believe that the ingestion of the blood of another creature
is strictly prohibited by the Bible, and that the free exercise clause of the first amendment
protects them against blood transfusions. See People ex rel. Wallace v. LaBrenz, 411 Ill.
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because he believes that the treatment will violate his right to bodily privacy."' If a patient refuses the recommended treatment, the
physician should require that the refusal be documented 52 and recorded in the patient's medical record. 3
The constitutional guarantees which afford a patient the right to
refuse treatment often conflict with other important interests. For
example, the state is interested in maintaining the ethical integrity
of the medical profession. 4 The state also is committed to preserving the health and lives of its citizens." Similarly, the medical
618, 621, 104 N.E.2d 769, 771-72 (1952). The following biblical passage is typical of
those relied upon by the society:
Moreover, ye shall eat no manner of blood, whether it be of fowl or of beast, in
any of your dwellings. Whatsoever soul it be that eateth any manner of blood,
even that soul shall be cut off from his people.
In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 662, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 646 (Fam. Ct. 1970) (quoting
Leviticus 7:26-27), afd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971). See generally WATCH
TOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA 17, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES &
THE QUESTION OF BLOOD (1977); Davis, The Refusal of Life-Saving Medical Treatment

v. the State's Interest in Preservationof Life.- A Clarification of the Interests at Stake, 58
WASH. U.L.Q. 85, 96-97 (1980); Moore, Their Life is in the Blood: Jehovah's Witnesses,
Blood Transfusions, and the Courts, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 281 (1983); Brief of the Amicus
Curiae Office of the Attorney General of the State of Maryland 11-17, Mercy Hosp., Inc.
v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
51. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976); Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d
443 (Sup. Ct. 1985). The exercise of the right to privacy in the medical setting is based
upon the patient's right of self-determination. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943).
52.

WISCONSIN Hosp. ASS'N, CONSENT MANUAL 13 (1969). One hospital associa-

tion has recommended the following form:
I,
(patient's name)
, refuse to allow anyone except the physician of my
choice to examine and treat me. The risks attendant to my refusal have been
fully explained to me and I fully understand that I will in all probability need
(briefly cite treatment indicated and time element involved)
and that if the same is not done, my chances for regaining normal health are
seriously reduced, and that in all probability, my refusal for such treatment or
procedure (may) (will) seriously imperil my life ....
NEW JERSEY HOSP. ASS'N, CONSENT MANUAL 29 (1972).
53. NORTH DAKOTA Hosp. ASS'N, CONSENT MANUAL 16 (1968). If the patient refuses to sign a refusal form, the consent form should be read aloud to him in the presence
of witnesses, and this communication should be recorded on the form and in the patient's
medical record. WISCONSIN Hosp. ASS'N, CONSENT MANUAL 13 (1969).
54. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 163-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
55. Id. at 162. This interest is especially prevalent when the lives of children are
involved because the state, occupying the position ofparenspatriae,is obliged as a parent
to all children to defend the rights of the child. A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 151 (3d ed. 1980).
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community strives to maintain the health of society.5 6 In certain
circumstances, such as when the life of an individual is threatened,
some courts have held that these interests override the citizen's
7
constitutional rights to refuse treatment.1
The state may choose to intervene and authorize treatment despite the patient's refusal.5" In the typical case, the hospital seeks
a court order authorizing treatment over the patient's objections. 9
The patient may subsequently file suit against the hospital or physician, alleging that his constitutional rights have been violated by
the court-ordered treatment. 6°
The availability of a refusal form which doubles as a release
56. See AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1982).
57. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 585, 279 A.2d 670, 674 (1971).
58. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 584-85, 279 A.2d
670, 674 (1971).
59. See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (court ordered that hospital could transfuse adult patient), reh'g
denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J.
Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (Law Div. 1974) (court allowed transfusion of infant); Application of Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (transfusion
ordered to stabilize pregnant woman's condition and to save the life of the fetus).
The courts generally require that children receive medical treatment even in direct
contravention of their parents' wishes. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411
I11.618, 626-27, 104 N.E.2d 769, 774 (guardian appointed for child and blood transfusion administered), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Matter of Gregory S, 85 Misc. 2d
846, 848, 380 N.Y.S.2d 620, 622 (Fam. Ct. 1976) (investigation ordered when mother
refused medical and dental care to sick children because of religious convictions); In re
Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 90, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (1962) (denying parents' request to
vacate emergency order authorizing necessary medical and surgical services for child).
One court utilized the parenspatriae theory, see supra note 55, to order a transfusion of
an adult patient in order to protect the patient's children, because her death would put
the burden of child-rearing upon the state. Application of Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128
Misc. 2d 804, 806-07, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996, 996-97 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
60. See, e.g., In re Brooks' Estate, 32 I11. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (husband
appealed appointment of conservator for his wife, alleging violation of first amendment
right to free exercise of religion); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (incompetent persons retain right of
privacy to refuse unwanted medical treatment, even though refusal is based on substituted judgment of court-appointed guardian ad litem).
Such suits may be brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982), which provides in relevant part:
(E)very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law. . ..
Id.
See, e.g., Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (administra-
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from liability 6' can render court authorization unnecessary. 62
When determining the validity of a medical liability release, courts
focus primarily on the bargaining power of the medical service entity and the public's ability to protect itself from that power.63 The
courts have held that "blanket releases," which purport to relieve
hospitals or physicians from liability for negligence, are contrary to
the public interest and hence are void.' The courts, however, have
trix alleged that decedent's right to religious freedom was violated by private defendants
acting under color of state law).
61. A release is a written contract documenting the intention of one party to discharge a second party from an obligation. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power
Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1348 (N.D. Ind. 1979), affid in part, vacated in part, 616 F.2d 976
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981). But see Colton v. New York Hosp.,
98 Misc. 2d 957, 965, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871-75 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (when the agreement
contemplates a future cause of action, it is characterized as a covenant not to sue rather
than a release). See generally H. GRAYSON, PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT: LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS §§ 4-46 to 4-60 (1971).
A standard refusal form used by a Chicago hospital provides as follows:
I request that no blood or blood derivations other than homologous (my own)
be administered to
during this hospitalization, notwithstanding
that such treatment may be deemed necessary in the opinion of the attending
physician or his assistants to preserve life, or promote recovery. I hereby release the hospital, its personnel, and the attending physician from any responsibility whatever for unfavorable reactions or any untoward results due to my
refusal to permit the use of blood or its derivations and I fully understand the
possible consequences or such refusal on my part.
Illinois Masonic Medical Center (1986). But see the model form suggested by the Illinois
Institute for Continuing Legal Education (ICLE), which does not contain language relieving the physician or hospital from liability:
I have considered the nature of my condition, the recommended course of treatment, the alternative methods of treatment, including non-treatment, and the
general hazards associated therewith. After careful consideration, I have decided to withhold consent to the performance of the following upon myself/the
patient:
I realize I may, at any time, revoke my refusal and, thereafter, consent to treatment by so notifying my physician, some other member of the Hospital Medical
Staff, or another professional employee of the Hospital.
Roberts, Simon & Ruelo, Informed Consent, in REPRESENTING HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS AND PROFESSIONALS § 18.77 (IICLE 1985).
62. Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 652, 695 P.2d 116, 120-21, cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 86 (1985); see also infra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
63. Other considerations may include: (1) whether the medical entity is suited to public regulation, (2) whether the entity offers an important public service, and (3) whether
the entity is willing to accommodate the needs of the public. See Tunkl v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98-101, 383 P.2d 441, 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37-38 (1963);
Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 607-09, 275 S.E.2d 163, 167-68 (1980),
affid, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn.
1977).
64. See Belshaw v. Feinstein, 258 Cal. App. 2d 711, 725-27, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788, 797-98
(1968); Smith v. Hospital Auth., 160 Ga. App. 387, 389-90, 287 S.E.2d 99, 101-02 (1981);
Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tenn. 1977) (court found void a release which
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not yet been presented with a "blanket release" which contains language of refusal. 65 A refusal should relieve medical professionals
from liability for the risks assumed by a patient who refuses to
accept treatment.66
67

D. Mitigation of Damages

Although a patient has a right to refuse medical treatment, a
patient who exercises this right has an obligation to minimize the
injuries that he will incur as a result of his refusal. 6 This obligation is based on the contractual duty to mitigate damages,69 and is
referred to in the torts context as the doctrine of "avoidable consequences." ' 70 The patient has a duty to take reasonable steps
to
71
avoid being injured or increasing the severity of his injuries.

If

the patient fails to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to
mitigate his damages, he is barred from recovering for that portion
of his injuries which could have been avoided. 72 The defendant has
the burden of establishing that the plaintiff failed to mitigate his
damages.7 3
When the patient's religious beliefs cause him to refuse treatment, the courts will examine the circumstances underlying the refusal in order to determine whether a reasonable opportunity to
mitigate existed.74 The free exercise clause precludes the courts
relieved physician and staff from liability for all complications associated with abortion
for the two years following the procedure). See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 704 (1966).
65. Brief of Respondents at 32, Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116
(1985).
66. See infra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
67. See generally 3 PERSONAL INJURY-ACTIONS, DAMAGES, DEFENSES §§ 4.01,
4.02 (L. Frumer & M. Friedman eds. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PERSONAL INJURY].
68. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 422-23 (1971); S.SCHREIBER, DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY 25-26 (1965).
69. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1144 (7th Cir. 1985); see also
Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill. 2d 129, 131-38, 483 N.E.2d 268, 269-72 (1985) (majority and
dissenting opinions discuss mitigation-of-damages doctrine in reference to "seatbelt
defense").
70. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1144 (7th Cir. 1985); see also
supra note 68.
71.

Michaud v. Stackino, 390 A.2d 524, 531 (Me. 1978).
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.10 (1956); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-4-33-2(a) (West Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.1 (1984); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 604.01 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.015 (Supp. 1986); see also UNIF.
COMPARATIVE FAULT AT § l(b), 12 U.L.A. 38 (1979).
73. 3 PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 67, at § 4.01[2]; see Slater v. Chicago Transit

72.

Auth., 5 Ill. App. 2d 181, 185, 125 N.E.2d 289, 291 (1955).
74. See, e.g., Christiansen v. Hollings, 44 Cal. App. 2d 332, 346, 112 P.2d 723, 729
(1941); Martin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 137, 140, 304 P.2d 828,
831 (1957); Walter Nashert & Sons v. McCann, 460 P.2d 941, 943 (Okla. 1969). See
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from considering whether a person's religious beliefs are reasonable.7" The patient, however, possesses no right to impose liability
that liability results solely from the paupon a third party when
76
tient's religious beliefs.
III.

SHORTER

A.

v.DRURY 7 7

The Facts

Elmer and Doreen Shorter were Jehovah's Witnesses whose religious beliefs forbade the receipt of blood transfusions.78 Mrs.
Shorter initially consulted the defendant, Dr. Drury, while she was
pregnant. Dr. Drury recommended a surgical procedure, dilation
discovering that Mrs. Shorter had suffered a
and curettage, after
"missed abortion."' 79 Of the three methods available to perform
this procedure,80 the doctor only discussed one - the curette
method - with the Shorters. 8 ' The doctor warned the couple that
both internal bleeding and puncture of the uterus might result
from this procedure.82 Mrs. Shorter consulted another doctor for a
second opinion; he reconfirmed the possibility that bleeding could
develop.3

Despite the risks inherent in the operation, Doreen Shorter decided to proceed. 4 She and her husband signed a form releasing
the hospital, its staff and the attending physician from liability for
the consequences of the Shorters' refusal to permit a blood transfusion. 5 During the operation, Dr. Drury punctured the patient's
generally 2 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 18, at § 16.31; Note, Medical Care,
Freedom of Religion, and Mitigation of Damages, 87 YALE L.J. 1466 (1978).
75. Martin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 137, 141, 304 P.2d 828,
830 (1957). See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
76. Martin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 137, 142, 304 P.2d 828,
831 (1957).
77. 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 86 (1985).
78. Id. at 647, 615 P.2d at 118.
79. Id.
80. Id. The procedure may be performed by a curette, by suction or with suppositories. Id.
81. Id. at 647-48, 695 P.2d at 118.
82. Id. at 648, 695 P.2d at 118.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 648, 695 P.2d at 118-19. All three methods presented the risk of bleeding;
the method chosen by the defendant posed the highest risk. Id. at 647-48, 695 P.2d at
118.
85. Id. at 648-49, 695 P.2d at 119. The following release was completed by the
Shorters:
GENERAL HOSPITAL OF EVERETT
Refusal to Permit Blood Transfusion
Hour 6oI5a.m.
Date November 30. 1979
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uterus, causing uncontrollable bleeding. 6 The physician informed
the patient of the extreme gravity of the situation - the continuous loss of blood threatened her life and a blood transfusion was
vital. 7 A fully cognizant Doreen Shorter refused to permit the
transfusion, as did her husband. 8 Even though the doctors surgically repaired the uterus without administering blood, Doreen
Shorter bled to death. 9
Notwithstanding his failure to consent to the procedure, Elmer
Shorter filed a wrongful death medical malpractice action, alleging
that Dr. Drury had been negligent and had failed in his duty of
informed consent. 90 The defendant denied any negligence, maintained that the release form relieved him from liability as a matter
of law,91 and asserted the affirmative defense of assumption of
risk. 92 Dr. Drury argued that even if the Shorters' assumption of
risk did not totally bar recovery, it should at least reduce the
amount of damages entered against him. 93 The jury found that the
defendant's negligence had proximately caused Mrs. Shorter's
death 94 and set damages at $412,000. 9 1 They reduced these damages by seventy-five percent, however, because they determined
that the Shorters "knowingly and voluntarily" assumed the risk
I request that no blood or blood derivatives be administered to Doreen V.
Shorter during this hospitalization. I hereby release the hospital, its personnel,
and the attending physician from any responsibility whatever for unfavorable
reactions or any untoward results due to my refusal to permit the use of blood
or its derivatives and I fully understand the possible consequences of such refusal on my part.
[/s/ Doreen Shorter]
Patient
[s/ Elmer Shorter]
Patient's Husband or Wife
Spousal consent is sought in two situations: when the reproductive capacity of one
spouse may be affected by the procedure, and when the patient may be unable to give
effective consent. See NORTH DAKOTA HosP. Ass'N, CONSENT MANUAL 14 (1968).
86. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 649, 695 P.2d at 119.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Brief of Respondents at 4, Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116
(1985). The suit was brought pursuant to Washington's wrongful death statute, which
states that "when the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default
of another, his personal representative may maintain an action for damages against the
person causing his death." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (1974).
91. Brief of Respondents at 4, Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116
(1985).
92. Id. at 5-6.
93. Id. at 6-7.
94. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 649, 695 P.2d at 119.
95. Id.
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that Mrs. Shorter might die from blood loss. 9 6
B.

The Decision of the Washington Supreme Court

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington, Mr. Shorter
argued that the release form violated public policy97 and that express assumption of risk failed to survive the enactment of Washington's comparative negligence statute. 98 The defendant crossappealed, contending that assumption of risk constituted a complete bar to recovery. 99
The court found that the release was valid. 1' ° It held that the
jury could have found that the Shorters had voluntarily executed
the release.'10 The court found that both of the doctors consulted
had apprised Mrs. Shorter of the risk of bleeding associated with
the procedure'02 and that she was fully aware of the specific risk of
death by blood loss. 10 3 Furthermore, the court found that the
Shorters voluntarily signed the release form in response to their
religious beliefs, not in response to any compulsion created by the
defendant. 104
The court also held that the refusal form did not violate public
policy. 1 5 The form did not purport to release the physician from
the consequences of his negligence;1°6 instead the release was limited specifically to the consequences of the refusal to accept
blood. 10 7 Additionally, the court found that the refusal provided
the defendant with a viable alternative to either refusing to treat
the patient or seeking a court order to transfuse the patient against
her will. 08
The court next held that assumption of risk survived the advent
of comparative negligence. 10 9 The court, however, distinguished
96. Id. at 649-50, 695 P.2d at 119.
97. Id. at 650, 695 P.2d at 119.
98. Id. at 653, 695 P.2d at 121.
99. Id. at 647, 695 P.2d at 118.
100. Id. at 651, 695 P.2d at 120.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 657, 695 P.2d at 123.
103. Id. at 652, 695 P.2d at 120.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The court emphasized this point three times. See id. at 650-52, 695 P.2d at 120;
see also supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
107. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 652, 695 P.2d at 120.
108. Id. at 652, 695 P.2d at 120-21.
109. Id. at 654-55, 695 P.2d at 122 (citing Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash.
2d 86, 95, 515 P.2d 821, 826 (1973)).
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express assumption of risk from contributory negligence, 110 holding that the former was a type of consent or waiver, not
negligence.
The court then examined whether the jury could have found that
the Shorters had expressly assumed the risk of death from bleeding. 112 The court found that the three elements of assumption of
risk - knowledge, understanding and voluntary encounter were present to support such a finding." 3 According to the court,
the Shorters were sufficiently advised of the specific possibility of
fatal bleeding as a result of the operation."I4 The record contained
enough evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the Shorters
had understood that risk,115 and that they had voluntarily assumed
the risk of Mrs. Shorter's death by blood16 loss as a result of their
refusal to authorize a blood transfusion."
C. The Dissenting Opinion
A substantial minority of the court 1 7 found that the majority
holding had excused the physician from liability for his negligence. 1 8 The dissent stated that the majority had failed to distinguish between the two situations in which the need for blood might
arise: the normal, non-negligent performance of the operation and
the negligent performance that actually caused the blood loss.'
The minority urged that the Shorters' assumption of the risk of0
2
death from blood loss was limited solely to the former scenario.
The dissent stated that express assumption of risk requires assent
not only to a specific type of risk but also to the magnitude of the
risk. 12 ' Dr. Drury's negligence increased the magnitude of the risk
to which the Shorters had assented, and therefore, the dissenters
maintained, the risk created was not one which the Shorters had
22
assumed. 1
110. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 656, 695 P.2d at 122.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 656, 695 P.2d at 123.
113. Id. at 656-59, 695 P.2d at 123-24.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. The Court was divided five to four. Id. at 660, 662, 695 P.2d at 124, 126.
118. Id. at 660, 695 P.2d at 124 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 660-61, 695 P.2d at 125.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 661, 695 P.2d at 125.
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IV.

ANALYSIS

In Shorter, the Washington Supreme Court reached the right result for the wrong reasons. The court correctly held that a knowing and voluntary refusal to permit treatment can reduce the
liability of a negligent physician. 2 3 The majority, however, relied
on faulty reasoning when it found that Mrs. Shorter, by signing the
refusal form, expressly assumed the risk of death from failure to
receive a transfusion, notwithstanding the defendant's negligence. 24 In its analysis, the court ignored Mrs. Shorter's oral refusal to receive blood after the negligently performed operation, a
refusal which provided a much stronger basis for a finding of express assumption of risk.12 1 In relying on the refusal form, the
court appeared to hold that the Shorters had assumed the risk of
the doctor's
negligence, a result which would violate public policy. 126 Finally, the doctor never argued, and thus the court did not
reach, the issue of the Shorters' failure to mitigate their damages, 2a7
failure which fully justified a reduction in the doctor's liability.
A. Assumption of the Risk of Death by Blood Loss
The court held that the Shorters had expressly assumed the specific risk that Mrs. Shorter could die as a result of refusing to authorize blood transfusions. 128 There were three points in time at
which the Shorters indicated that they would refuse to authorize
blood transfusions: during consultations with the doctors before
Mrs. Shorter entered the hospital,1 29 when the couple signed the
refusal form, 30 and after Dr. Drury's negligence had occurred.'
The court, however, discussed only the consultations and the written release in finding that the elements of express assumption of
risk were established. 3 2 While the court's reliance on the refusal
form may have been. mistaken, the subsequent oral refusal ignored
by the court clearly established that the Shorters had expressly as123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
(1985).
130.
131.
132.

Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d
See infra notes 139-44
See infra notes 145-47
See infra notes 148-56
See infra notes 157-69
Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d
Brief of Appellants at

at 656-59, 695 P.2d at 123-24.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
at 659, 695 P.2d at 124.
13, Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116

Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 648-49, 695 P.2d at 119.
Id. at 649, 695 P.2d at 119.
Id. at 657, 695 P.2d at 123.
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sumed the specific risk of Mrs. Shorter's death from bleeding as a
result of their failure to authorize a blood transfusion.
The Shorters' consultations with two doctors before Mrs.
Shorter entered the hospital supported the court's finding that the
decision to refuse a transfusion was made with both knowledge and
an understanding of the possible consequences.' 33 Dr. Drury explained to the Shorters that fatal bleeding might occur during the
course of a non-negligently performed operation if transfusions
were not administered.134 The second physician consulted by the
couple confirmed this possibility. 35 The Shorters, therefore, knew
and appreciated the specific risk that the operation could cause fa36
tal bleeding. 1

The prehospitalization consultations also provided some support
for the court's finding that the Shorters' assumption of risk was
"voluntary."'' 37 Mrs. Shorter informed Dr. Drury during her initial consultation that her religious beliefs would prevent her from
accepting a blood transfusion. 38 At first glance, this "compulsion"
to remain bound to her religious beliefs appears to be one which
would render her action involuntary. That, however, is not the
case since Mrs. Shorter freely chose to follow the tenets of the Jehovah's Witness faith. Thus, before Mrs. Shorter entered the hospital, the Shorters knew and understood the risk of refusing blood
and appeared ready to voluntarily assume that risk.
Moreover, the language of the hospital release form specifically
stated that the couple understood and appreciated the consequences of their refusal.'39 It is not as clear, however, that the
Shorters voluntarily signed the release form. Mr. Shorter admitted
that Dr. Drury neither asked the Shorters to sign the form nor
requested that the hospital have the couple complete it.'40 The
form, however, was provided by the hospital, 14' thus putting the
Shorters into a situation in which they had little bargaining
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
(1985).
139.
140.
(1985).
141.

Id.
Id. at 647-48, 695 P.2d at 118.
Id. at 648, 695 P.2d at 118.
Id. at 657, 695 P.2d at 123.
Id. at 651, 695 P.2d at 120.
Brief of Appellants at 13, Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116
See supra note 85.
Brief of Appellants at 63, Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116
Id. at 64.
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power. 4 2 To the extent that completion of the form was a precondition to surgery, the Shorters' lack of bargaining power might
have rendered the release invalid as against public policy.' 43 Thus,
while the Shorters' prehospitalization statements indicated that
they would voluntarily assume the risks of refusing blood transfusions, "I the actual signing of the release form may not have been
free from compulsion.
The most critical refusal was the third refusal, which occurred
after the doctor lacerated the patient's uterus. The Shorters chose
to remain exposed to the risk created by their refusal and the doctor's negligence. "I Their decision to adhere to their religious beliefs was voluntary, and it resulted from reasoning identical to that
supporting Mrs. Shorter's comments during the initial consultations. 4 6 In addition, sufficient evidence established that the
Shorters knew of and appreciated the risk of death at this juncture. 1 7 All of the elements of express assumption of risk were
therefore present. Thus, despite some questionable findings as to
the validity of the release form, the court correctly concluded that
the refusal to authorize treatment supported a reduction in the
damages awarded to the plaintiff, who with his wife expressly assumed the risks resulting from the refusal.
B.

Release from Negligence

Even if the refusal form represented a knowing and voluntary
decision by the Shorters, it violated public policy if it released Dr.
Drury from liability for his negligence.' 48 While the Shorters could
expressly assume the risk of death as a consequence of their refusal, 49 they could not assume the risk of the doctor's negligence.' 5 ° But the physician's negligence, not the refusal or a nonnegligently performed operation, created the grave need for
blood.'
Thus, by holding that the Shorters assumed the risk of
blood loss caused by an operation which admittedly was negli142. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 7, Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695
P.2d 116 (1985).
143. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
145. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 649, 695 P.2d at 119.
146. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
147. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 649, 695 P.2d at 119.
148. Id. at 660, 695 P.2d at 124 (Pearson, J., dissenting); see supra notes 63-64 and
accompanying text.
149. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 659, 695 P.2d at 124.
150. Id. at 660, 695 P.2d at 124 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
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gently performed,1 2 the court arguably was holding, in violation of
public policy, that the Shorters had assumed the risk of the doctor's negligence.' 53
The language of the refusal form itself'54 was of little help in
determining the scope of the release. The form failed to differentiate between a transfusion made necessary by unavoidable bleeding
and one made necessary by a negligently performed operation."55
By effectively interpreting the form as covering the latter situation,
the court allowed Dr. Drury to be released from liability for the
consequences of his negligence, despite the court's own holding
that the Shorters had not assumed the risk of negligence. 5 6
C. Failure to Mitigate Damages
The court could properly have analyzed the combined effect of
the Shorters' express assumption of risk and the physician's negligence if the defendant had focused on the refusal that occurred
after the operation and had argued application of the common-law
doctrine of "avoidable consequences."' 57 If the Shorters' failure to
mitigate their damages was reasonable, the plaintiff should have
suffered no reduction in damages.158 The evidence, however,
clearly established that the Shorters' failure was unreasonable.' 59
Therefore, Mr. Shorter should have had his recovery reduced by
the amount of damages flowing from his failure to mitigate."6
The Shorters clearly had an opportunity to minimize their
losses. Both Mr. and Mrs. Shorter were in a position to authorize
a blood transfusion subsequent to the negligent performance of the
operation. 16 ' Both knew that death was probably imminent without a transfusion 162 and that a transfusion probably would save
Mrs. Shorter's life. 63 Given the gravity of Mrs. Shorter's condition, the refusal clearly was unreasonable. The fact that it was
152. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 657-59, 695 P.2d at 123-24.
153. See id. at 660, 695 P.2d at 124 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
154. See supra note 85.
155. Id.
156. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 659, 695 P.2d at 124; see supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. Washington law now includes
"unreasonable failure to . . . mitigate damages" as a form of comparative fault. See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.015 (Supp. 1986).
158. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
161. Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 649, 695 P.2d at 119.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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based on the Shorters' religious convictions'" did not make the
refusal any more reasonable. The Shorters had no right to impose
liability on a third party, the defendant, because of their religious
beliefs.' 65 Therefore, the Shorters' refusal to authorize a blood
transfusion clearly constituted an unreasonable failure to mitigate
damages.
Since Mrs. Shorter probably would have survived if either she or
her husband had authorized a transfusion,' 66 the plaintiff, Mr.
Shorter, should have been held liable for the consequences flowing
from his failure to mitigate,' 67 namely, his wife's death. If a transfusion had been authorized, and if Mrs. Shorter had therefore survived, Mr. Shorter would not have had an actionable claim for
damages under Washington's wrongful death statute.' 61 Instead,
69
Mrs. Shorter would have had a simple claim of negligence.'
The application of the mitigation doctrine may appear harsh in
this context. However, application of the doctrine here would lead
to a more equitable result, a result which would recognize that the
defendant was helpless to save the patient's life because of the
Shorters' failure to authorize a blood transfusion. Assessment of
liability to the Shorters for failing to mitigate would preclude Mr.
Shorter from benefiting from the state of helplessness that he
helped to create.
V.

SHORTER'S IMPACT ON LITIGATION AND THE RESOLUTION
OF ETHICAL DILEMMAS

Although the Shorter court failed to assess properly the parties'
respective liabilities, the court's recognition of the validity of a refusal should have considerable impact in jurisdictions where express assumption of risk has survived comparative fault.' 7 °
Legislatures should enact statutes recognizing and authorizing the
use of valid refusal forms by medical practitioners. Statutory codification of the effect of a refusal to permit treatment will provide
clearer guidance to the courts and will reduce medical malpractice
litigation.' 7 ' Moreover, a legally sufficient refusal will give physicians a viable and ethical alternative to seeking court-authorized
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 649, 695 P.2d at 119.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
See Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 650, 695 P.2d at 119.
See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
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treatment.172 Finally, specific statutory recognition that a valid refusal constitutes an express assumption of the risks flowing from
the refusal will result in a more equitable apportionment of damages between the physician and the refusing patient.
A.

A Potential Decrease in Litigation

Statutes codifying the availability of a refusal as a damage-reducing defense will provide the courts with clear guidance in cases in
which patient refusals prevent physicians from minimizing the effects of their own negligence. Such statutes should provide that
while physicians cannot be released from the consequences of their
negligence, 173 a refusal to permit treatment will constitute express
assumption of the risks resulting from the patient's failure to mitigate his damages. The patient will thus be liable for that percentage of damages attributable to the failure to permit damage74
reducing treatment.1
The availability of a refusal as a manifestation of express assumption of risk will serve judicial economy by precluding the filing of suits in which the plaintiff alleges the deprivation of
constitutional rights to free exercise of religion or bodily privacy.
The refusal will permit medical professionals to respect
the patient's objections instead of administering the undesired
treatment and exposing themselves to a lawsuit. Physicians will no
longer feel obligated
to seek court orders to administer unwanted
76
treatments. 1
Moreover, recognition of the refusal as a damage-reducing factor will discourage the filing of medical malpractice suits in some
comparative negligence jurisdictions. The Shorter decision arose in
a jurisdiction which had adopted the "pure" form of comparative
negligence. 7 1 In that case, the jury apportioned seventy-five percent of the fault to the Shorters because they had assumed the risk
of Mrs. Shorter's death. 178 Consideration of the couple's failure to
mitigate 179 might even have increased the percentage. In some jurisdictions, a plaintiff whose fault was found to be so much greater
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See infra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 24.
Shorter, 103 Wash. 2d at 647, 695 P.2d at 118.
See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
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than the defendant's would recover nothing.180 In such jurisdictions, potential litigants who have refused treatment will be less
likely to file suit in view of the probable unfavorable outcome.",
Astute plaintiffs' attorneys will attempt to settle out of court in
these jurisdictions, hoping that their clients will be at lease minimally compensated.1 8 2 Even plaintiffs in "pure" comparative negligence jurisdictions will settle more readily if they anticipate that
out-of-court settlement will lead to a larger recovery by avoiding a
jury's somewhat subjective assessment of fault.
B. Ethical Considerations
A physician's concerns go beyond those of legal liability; he also
must be concerned with the ethics of his profession. 183 For example, in a non-emergency situation, a physician is faced with three
alternatives when a patient refuses to authorize a particular treatment or procedure: he may (1) inform the patient that he cannot
treat him and recommend another physician; (2) perform strictly
in accordance with the patient's wishes; or (3) accept the patient's
refusal, but remain prepared to perform the unauthorized treatment if an emergency occurs.' 84 A doctor should neither have to
insist that a competent adult patient submit to the proposed treatment nor have to force the treatment upon the patient against the
patient's will. 185
The legally sufficient refusal protects the integrity of the hospital
as a "helping" institution and of the physician as a professional.' 86
The ethical conflict created by the patient's refusal is eliminated by
the additional legal recognition, in the form of the refusal, of the
patient's right to self-determination. 18 7 The patient's signed refusal to authorize a particular procedure, when properly drafted,
relieves the hospital and physician from liability 8 and represents
180.

See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.

See P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, SETTLEMENT OUT OF COURT: THE DisPosi181.
TION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (1982) (empirical analysis of out-of-court

settlements).
182. See P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, THE RESOLUTION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS (1982) (empirical analysis of the disposition of litigated claims).
183.
184.

See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1982).
See Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration and Statement of Additional Au-

thorities at 19, Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116 (1985).
185. St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
186. See United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965).
187.

See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,

739-40, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426-27 (1977); see also supra note 51.
188. See supra note 61.
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the profession's concession to and recognition of the patient's constitutional rights. 18 9
A refusal is even possible in emergency situations in which the
patient himself is incapable of consenting to an express assumption
of a specific risk. A guardian or spouse, as the party most likely to
be aware of the patient's religious beliefs or concerns about bodily
privacy, can refuse the particular treatment on the patient's behalf.190 The refusal will allow the professionals to administer only
authorized emergency care, thus avoiding potential liability for
performing in direct contravention of the patient's wishes.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A documented refusal is a viable means of reducing a plaintiff's
recovery in a comparative negligence jurisdiction. A valid refusal,
that is, one in accord with public policy, sufficiently manifests express assumption of risk, which can be considered as a type of fault
in the apportionment of liability. The refusal form should delineate exactly what risks the patient has assumed and should state
that medical professionals are not relieved of liability for the consequences of any negligent conduct. At trial, the defendant-physician should argue the patient's duty to mitigate damages: if
damages are to be equitably apportioned, the patient must be held
accountable for his refusal to permit treatment that would have
minimized his losses. The mitigation argument is imperative to
the physician's defense since public policy precludes a finding that
the patient assumed any risk of the physician's negligence.
The Shorter decision illustrates that a valid refusal can play an
important role in a medical malpractice case. The court recognized that medical professionals need an affirmative defense when
patients are injured by their own refusals to accept treatment. The
survival of express assumption of risk allows use of the refusal as a
damage-reducing factor in comparative negligence jurisdictions.
As a result, the medical community should, by using this defense,
be able to achieve a major reduction in professional liability as
damages are more equitably apportioned in refusal cases. At the
189. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 48 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d
713 (1984) (family could decide to discontinue use of artificial life-sustaining devices on
semi-comatose patient); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279
A.2d 670 (1971) (mother refused to consent to a blood transfusion for her unconscious
adult daughter); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 218 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (Law
Div. 1974) (parents refused to allow a blood transfusion to be administered to their 6-dayold infant).

1986]

Shorter v. Drury

505

same time, hospitals and physicians will be able to rely on valid
refusal forms to resolve the ethical dilemma created when a patient
refuses necessary treatment.
ALISA BETH ARNOFF

